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ABSTRACT 
During the 1990s, many Russian non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) secured foreign 
funding and participated in transnational advocacy networks. However, in the early 2000s, 
Russian authorities attempted to regain control over foreign-funded NGOs’ activities, presenting 
these NGOs as national security threats. The 2012 Russian Foreign Agents Law and the 
resulting 2018 challenge before the European Court of Human Rights reflect contemporary 
Russian political rhetoric that views Western governments and their agents, including NGOs, as 
threats to Russian sovereignty and national security. However, legal challenges also de-politicize 
the issues by forcing all parties into the framework of legal argument, reflecting the decline of 
political pluralism in Russia. Revitalizing Russia’s civil and political landscapes requires a 
thorough redefinition of national security, one that includes NGOs participating in transnational 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s, many Russian non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) successfully secured foreign funding and 
participated in transnational advocacy networks.1 However, in the early 
2000s, Russian authorities expressed concern over foreign-funded 
                                               
 1 Miriam Matejova, Stefan Parker, & Peter Dauvergne, The Politics of 
Repressing Environmentalists as Agents of Foreign Influence, 72 AUSTRALIAN J. INT’L AFF. 
149 (2018). Transnational advocacy networks are characterized by the participation 
of a variety of actors, such as “individuals, civic groups, international organizations 
and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs),” etc., that interact with 
each other around issues of common concern. Alexandra-Maria Bocşe, 
“Understanding Transnational Advocacy Networks: How the Political Opportunity 
Structure Impacts Their Emergence,” Proceedings of the Conference “EU Strategy for the 
Danube Region. Conference on regional cooperation” organized by The Institute for the Danube 
Region and Central Europe, Vienna, 15 December 2011, at 121 (citing David Held, 
Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System, 20 ECON. & SOC’Y 138, 138–72 
(1991)). Transnational advocacy networks include members “situated across state 
borders and at least one actor in the network is a non-state agent. . . .” Alexandra-
Maria Bocşe, “Understanding Transnational Advocacy Networks: How the Political 
Opportunity Structure Impacts Their Emergence,” Proceedings of the Conference “EU 
Strategy for the Danube Region. Conference on regional cooperation” organized by The Institute for 
the Danube Region and Central Europe, Vienna, 15 December 2011, at 121 (citing 
Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Introduction, in 
BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC 
STRUCTURES, AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 3–33 (Thomas Risse-Kappen 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995)). 
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NGOs and “expressed a clear desire to regain control over the 
activities of non-profit groups.”2 The Foreign Agents Law,3 enacted in 
2012 and continually amended until 2016, reflects contemporary 
Russian political rhetoric that views Western governments and their 
agents, including NGOs, as attempting to undermine Russia’s ruling 
regime and threatening national security.4 The Foreign Agents Law 
requires domestic NGOs receiving foreign funding and participating 
in political activities on the territory of the Russian Federation “to 
register and advertise their status as ‘foreign agents.’”5 Many Russian 
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks that rely on 
foreign funding due to lack of domestically available funds have been 
stigmatized and, in some cases, forced to shut down as a result of the 
law. The chilling effect created by the provisions of the Foreign Agents 
Law impacts not only the relationship between NGOs and the state, 
but also the very nature of governance and political pluralism in Russia. 
It also arguably violates constitutionally established principles of 
freedom of association and expression. 
Part I of this article examines the reasons behind a global trend 
towards enhancing governmental control over NGOs that receive 
foreign funding and participate in transnational advocacy networks. It 
looks at the intensification of nationalism within nation-states that are 
forced to deal with geopolitical forces beyond their control, and the 
international pressure on nation-states as a result of NGOs working in 
cooperation with global partners. This part also discusses the role of 
constitutional courts in shaping and reshaping the very concept of 
national sovereignty and the impact of their reasoning on foreign-
                                               
 2 Françoise Daucé, The Duality of Coercion in Russia: Cracking Down on “Foreign 
Agents,” 23 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA: J. POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION 57, 61 (2015). 
 3 See generally Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Otdel’nye 
Zakonodatel’nye Akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel’nosti 
Nekommercheskikh Organizatsii, Vipolniyaiushikh Funktsii Innostrannovo Agenta 
[Fed. Law of the Russian Fed’n on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Fed’n Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Org.s 
Performing the Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. 
GAZ.] Jul 20, 2012, No. 121 [hereinafter “FOREIGN AGENTS LAW”]. 
 4 Thomas M. Callahan, Cauldron of Unwisdom: The Legislative Offensive on 
Insidious Foreign Influence in the Third Term of President Vladimir V. Putin, and ICCPR 
Recourse for Affected Civil Advocates, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1219, 1221–22 (2015). 
 5 Id. at 1222 (quoting FOREIGN AGENTS LAW). 
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funded NGOs. Part II outlines the overall legislative scheme created 
by the 2012 Foreign Agents Law as well as amendments to the law. 
This part also looks at some of the major criticisms of the law, 
emphasizing the terms “foreign agent” and “political activity” as well 
as the breadth of the foreign funding requirement.6 Due to the Russian 
government’s assertion that the Russian Foreign Agents Law is 
modeled on the United States Foreign Agents Registration Act 
(“FARA”),7 this part examines both the 2014 decision by the Russian 
Constitutional Court upholding the constitutionality of the regime 
established by the Foreign Agents Law and the 1987 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Meese v. Keene dealing with the constitutionality of 
certain provisions of FARA.8 Part III explores the key differences 
between FARA and the Russian Foreign Agents Law, including the 
overall purpose behind these pieces of legislation. This part also 
highlights the similarities and differences between the majority and 
dissenting opinions in the Russian and U.S. constitutional cases 
discussed in Part II. Part IV of the article considers the impact of the 
Russian Foreign Agents law on the development of Russian civil 
society as well as on political governance. The article concludes that 
legal challenges de-politicize these issues, reflecting the decline of 
political pluralism in Russia. Finally, the article suggests the necessity 
of a thorough rethinking of the notion of national security that 
includes NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks as 
partners in providing security. 
I. NGOS AS TRANSLATORS OF GLOBAL STANDARDS 
States around the world have been enacting various legislative 
measures aimed at enhancing their control over NGOs that receive 
funding from abroad and participate in transnational advocacy 
                                               
 6 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye 
Akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel’nosti Nekommercheskikh 
Organizatsii, Vipolniyaiushikh Funktsii Innostrannovo Agenta [Fed. Law of the 
Russian Fed’n on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Fed’n 
Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Org.s Performing the 
Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Jul 20, 2012, No. 
121. 
 7 22 U.S.C. ch.11, subch. II § 611 et. seq. 
 8 See generally Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987). 
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networks.9 Governments frequently frame these measures as attempts 
to encourage transparency in national political debates and to increase 
national security, but the activities of NGOs receiving foreign funding 
have been portrayed in many instances as unpatriotic, undermining 
state sovereignty and opposing domestic interests.10 This threatening 
portrayal of foreign-funded NGOs in part reflects the “‘intensification 
of nationalism within nation-states’” dealing with increasing demands 
for acceptance of international norms, and the struggle of nations to 
“‘impose order upon geopolitical forces beyond their locus of 
control.’”11 This global trend towards delegitimizing NGOs with 
foreign funding is partially driven by two factors: (1) the pressure that 
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks place on their 
domestic governments and (2) the construction of national identities 
in the face of globalism through discourses of inclusion and exclusion 
that reinforce and emphasize distinctions between “insiders and 
outsiders.”12 On a number of occasions, NGOs with global partners 
have utilized international exposure and the resulting international 
pressure to generate domestic momentum for reform.13 This NGO 
strategy of “[t]hrowing a boomerang” to find international partners has 
influenced “local social and political dynamics, altering the relationship 
between domestic NGOs and the state, sometimes shifting the 
domestic balance of power.”14 
However, the impact of transnational advocacy networks 
extends beyond pressuring local governments regarding issue-specific 
causes. It is within these transnational networks that global standards 
and practices are often developed and shaped. Domestic NGOs 
                                               
 9 See generally Miriam Matejova, Stefan Parker, & Peter Dauvergne, The Politics 
of Repressing Environmentalists as Agents of Foreign Influence, 72 AUSTRALIAN J. INT’L AFF. 
145 (2018). 
 10 See LINCOLN A. MITCHELL, THE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION PARADOX 98 
(Brookings Inst. Press 2016). 
 11 Anna Popkova, Global Partners or International Spies? A Comparative Analysis 
of the Russian Media’s Coverage of the Law on ‘Foreign Agents,’ 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3062, 
3063 (2016) (quoting Ryan J. Thomas & Mary Grace Antony, Competing Constructions 
of British National Identity: British Newspaper Comment on the 2012 Olympics Opening 
Ceremony, 37 MEDIA CULTURE & SOC’Y 493, 494 (2015)). 
 12 Popkova, supra note 11, at 3063–64. 
 13 See Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 147. 
 14 Id. 
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frequently serve as “sites of implementation,” actively engaging in the 
“transferring, adopting and adjusting of global standards to local 
practices. . . .”15 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the role of NGOs in 
transnational advocacy networks is not limited to serving as simple 
conduits of externally-developed standards, but rather involves 
domestic NGOs actively contributing to shaping these global 
standards. For example, a grant awarded by an international 
organization to a domestic NGO makes the donor and the NGOs co-
designers who mutually influence and transform each other’s practices 
and ideas.16 In other words, “[t]hrough grants, donors introduce 
policies and standards related to democracy, stakeholder governance, 
civil rights, and environmental protection that may be new to the 
domestic political sphere. These policies are not necessarily supported 
by national governments.”17 
States under pressure due to the direction of attention towards 
a specific violation, or more generally due to constant highlighting of 
systemic issues, frequently do not react favorably to such efforts by 
NGOs.18 Nation-states may view NGOs that focus on issues including 
human rights law, environmental law, and international criminal law as 
enabling challengers to states’ exercise of power and monopoly on 
violence, thus challenging the very notion of state sovereignty.19 
Therefore, because NGO-generated and supported transnational 
pressure may result in domestic policy changes—or at least changes in 
rhetoric to satisfy the international community—threatened states start 
to view such foreign-funded NGOs as “seditious” and even as threats 
to national security.20 While states are frequently eager to portray 
international legal norms, human rights principles, and NGOs working 
                                               
 15 Maria Tysiachniouk, Svetlana Tulaeva, & Laura A. Henry, Civil Society under 
the Law ‘On Foreign Agents’: NGO Strategies and Network Transformation, 70 EUROPE-
ASIA STUD. 615, 632 (2018). 
 16 See id. at 618. 
 17 Id. at 619. 
 18 Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 147. 
 19 Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Sovereignty of International Law?, 67 
UNIV. TORONTO L. J. 496, 507, 510 (2017). 
 20 Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 147. 
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to advance them as undermining national sovereignty, the actual 
relationship between international law—including human rights law—
and state sovereignty is more nuanced. International law must 
ultimately operate in part inside the nation-state.21 This operation 
inside the nation-state and its foundation in national institutions and 
practices “‘lends it a distinctive power and legitimacy.’”22 Thus, the 
interplay of international norms and domestic sovereignty concerns is 
not one between purely oppositional forces, for states contribute to 
the shaping and legitimizing of international principles and practices. 
Furthermore, because some governments may be unable to satisfy 
many of their citizens’ needs, affected citizens may seek help from 
various NGOs. Thus, NGOs often become a vital link between 
citizens and their governments.23 National security—that is, security 
from outside threats as well as domestic economic, ecological, and 
social security—can be a joint effort of both governmental and non-
governmental organizations,24 but NGOs may have the advantage in 
enabling citizens to communicate with their governments more 
effectively. By working to address a multitude of social problems, 
NGOs become a way—indeed, sometimes the only way—for popular 
complaints to reach public officials.25 However, this connection with 
the public, combined with participation in transnational advocacy 
networks and receipt of foreign funds, may foster suspicion among 
governmental organizations against NGOs.26 The combination of 
foreign funding, connectivity to global norms, and ability to shape 
                                               
 21 Irina Ceric, The Sovereign Charter: Security, Territory and the Boundaries of 
Constitutional Rights, 44 OTTAWA L. REV. 353, 373 (2012–13) (quoting SASKIA SASSEN, 
LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 65 (Columbia 
Univ. Press 1996)). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Denis V. Iroshnikov, “Vzaimodeistvie Organiv Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti s 
Obschestvennymi Ob’edineniyami v Tselyah Obespechaniya Natsionalnoi 
Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Uridicheskya Nauka (2012) 3 at 18. 
 24 Id. at 22. 
 25 Pavel Petrovich Fantrov, Nekommercheskie Organizatsii I Sistema 
Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti v Rossii: Rol’ Nepravitel’stvennyh Ob’edinenii, Imeuschih Status 
Inostrannogo Agenta, 18:303 UGROZY I BEZOPASNOST 59, 59 (2015). 
 26 Id. at 58. 
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public opinion underpins the discourse of NGOs as threats to national 
security and undermining state sovereignty.27 
Despite the complex and intertwined nature of the relationship 
between state sovereignty, national security, international norms, and 
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks, the work of 
increasingly prominent domestic NGOs around the world is being 
presented by domestic governments as challenging state sovereignty 
and catering to foreign interests, especially when it comes to human 
rights.28 Domestic legislative measures seemingly aimed at increasing 
transparency and ensuring national security by effectively reducing 
NGOs’ access to foreign funding create fractures in domestic civil 
society29 and de-politicize NGOs by reducing their contact with 
foreign partners and participation in transnational advocacy 
frameworks.30 In addition to creating legal barriers between domestic 
NGOs and other actors in a transnational network, governmental 
“‘regulatory offensive[s]’”31 contribute to the growth of informal 
practices (such as operating without registration or ending formal legal 
status entirely) between domestic NGOs, their international and 
domestic partners, and state officials, placing NGOs’ work into a “grey 
area” of uncertainty.32 While informality may aid in avoiding 
administrative penalties, NGOs operating informally cannot be as 
effective in their interactions with state agencies, and are thus unable 
to participate in governance effectively, further contributing to the de-
politicization of NGOs and the reduction of their policy footprint.33 
                                               
 27 Id. at 63. 
 28 See Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 148. 
 29 Being designated as a “foreign agent” may result in other members of civil 
society (such as NGOs that do not accept foreign funding) being reluctant to engage 
with foreign funded NGOs, despite common causes pursued by both foreign funded 
and domestically funded NGOs, creating fractures in domestic civil society. 
Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry, supra note 15, at 625. 
 30 Matejova, Parker, & Dauvergne, supra note 9, at 155. 
 31 Id. at 148 (quoting Kendra E. Dupuy, James Ron, & Aseem Prakash, Who 
Survived? Ethiopia’s Regulatory Crackdown on Foreign-Funded NGOs, 22 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 419, 420, 423 (2015)). 
 32 Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry, supra note 15, at 630. 
 33 NGOs choosing informality as a strategy and operating without official 
legal registration can no longer participate in public hearings, offer expertise to 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:2 
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Domestic governments are deliberately attempting to 
“reconstitute[] the human rights field as a national security threat.”34 As a result, 
NGOs, especially those concerned with human rights, are increasingly 
scrutinized on national security grounds.35 The work of NGOs, 
especially when this work is connected with challenging the existing 
social contract between the state and its citizens, is gradually framed as 
an existential threat.36 The issues are discussed “‘either as a special kind 
of politics or as above politics,’ which paves the way for exceptional 
intervention that may violate normal legal and social rules.”37 Once this 
reframing is adopted and legitimized in the eyes of the public, the 
actual “threat” posed by the work of NGOs with foreign funding and 
links to transnational advocacy networks becomes irrelevant.38 Issues 
of national identity and national values then become closely linked with 
discourses of needing to oppose foreign threats or influences, creating 
a “state of psychological siege,” with NGOs caught in the midst of this 
political standoff.39 Perpetuating the rhetoric of needing to respond to 
foreign threats and “keeping the population in ‘survival mode’” 
becomes essential to the survival of the domestic regime itself.40  
Due to the complexity of the relationship between 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, constitutional 
courts play an increasingly significant role in negotiating these 
“contested legal spaces. . . .”41 In a way, constitutional courts have 
                                               
government officials or work on public councils. Tysiachniouk, Tulaeva, & Henry, 
supra note 15, at 629, 634. 
 34 Neve Gordon, Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the Campaign 
against Human Rights NGOs, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 311, 312 (2014). “In Canada, 
China, India, Israel . . . [and] Russia . . . governments are cracking down on foreign-
funded NGOs” that operate within their jurisdictions. Lawrence Solomon, Lawrence 
Solomon: The Worldwide Crackdown on NGOs, FINANCIAL POST (May 18, 2015, 4:14 
PM), https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/lawrence-solomon-the-
worldwide-crackdown-on-ngos. 
 35 Gordon as Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 317 (quoting BARRY BUZAN & LENE HANSEN, THE EVOLUTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009)). 
 38 Jardar Ostbo, Securitizing ‘Spiritual-Moral Values’ in Russia, 33 POST-SOVIET 
AFF. 200, 202 (2017). 
 39 Id. at 212. 
 40 Id. at 213. 
 41 Ceric, supra note 21, at 368. 
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become intimately involved in constructing “the juridical framework 
of national sovereignty.”42 In states hostile to NGOs’ involvement in 
transnational advocacy networks, constitutional courts frequently use 
powerful tools like “proportionality” to determine whether state 
measures are both (1) “necessary” in a democratic society and (2) 
proportional to the aims of transparency and national security.43 In 
other words, while the courts acknowledge that proportionality is key 
when striking a balance between human rights and national security,44 
the way that various stages of proportionality analysis are presented 
makes it clear that both national governments and constitutional courts 
often view national security as a necessary precondition for the state 
to guarantee human rights protections.45 It is pointed out that a balance 
between human rights and national security is jurisdictional as well as 
time-specific, and that there are no “universal standards” when it 
comes to striking such a balance.46 Thus, limiting a right is not 
necessarily the same as violating a right.47 While a government’s 
attempts to assert greater control over NGOs that receive foreign 
funding may reduce or even eliminate services provided by NGOs, 
concerns of sovereignty and narrowly defined national security take 
precedence.48 Throughout this process, constitutional courts become 
complicit in delegitimizing NGOs.49 Thus, constitutional courts may 
not only reduce democratic pluralism but may also decrease human 
rights protections and citizens’ contributions to political governance. 
                                               
 42 Id. 
 43 Gregoire C.N. Webber, Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional 
Rights Scholarship, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 179, 198 (2010). 
 44 Sergei U. Chapchikov, Problemy Formirovaniya Konstitutsionnoi Doktriny 
Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1 PROBELY V ROSSIISKOM 
ZAKONODATEL’STVE 17 (2012). 
 45 A.V. Tulikov, Obespechenie Informatsionnoi Bezopasnosti kak Garantiya Prav 
Cheloveka, 2 PRAVO. ZHURNAL VYSSCHEI SHKOLY EKONOMIKI, 57 (2015). 
 46 V.A. Nomokonov, Prava Cheloveka I Natsional’naya Bezopasnost, 2:4 
CRIMINOLOGICHESKII ZHURNAL OGUEP, 5-6 (2008). 
 47 Id. at 8. 
 48 Fantrov, supra note 25, at 63. 
 49 Ceric, supra note 21, at 370 states that constitutional jurisprudence has the 
capacity to “catalyse[] direct acts of sovereignty by the state.” 
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II. RUSSIAN CRACKDOWN ON FOREIGN-FUNDED NGOS 
Beginning in the early 2000s, the Russian government became 
progressively concerned over the activities of foreign-funded NGOs, 
claiming that these NGOs were harming Russian national security 
interests and that their campaigns were “initiated by foreign 
intelligence agencies” aiming to overthrow the current Russian 
regime.50 Suspicions only increased after the 2011–12 public protests 
regarding the violation of voting procedures during the Russian 
presidential election.51 The authorities viewed these massive protests 
as sponsored by the West and designed to effect regime change.52 
Thus, these “Western influence[s]” and those who supported them 
became associated with “undermin[ing] the country from within.”53 
Legislation aimed at suppressing the work of NGOs receiving 
foreign funding has to be contextualized within a broader policy of the 
Russian government directed at the “‘nationalization of elites’”54 and 
reasserting its sovereignty and importance on the global stage, 
particularly as relations with the West continued to deteriorate. The 
Russian government’s attempts to discredit foreign-funded NGOs 
accords with the Russian government’s conception of Russian national 
identity as antagonistic to Western values55 and instead grounded in 
                                               
 50 See generally Sergei Vasilevich Ustinkin et al., Otsenka Vozdeistviya 
Nepravitelstvennyh Organizatsii na Izbiratelnyi Protesess v Rossii, 7 VLAST 28, 28–29 (2016). 
 51 Popkova, supra note 11, at 3067. 
 52 Pavel Romanov & Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, ‘Foreign Agents’ in the Field of 
Social Policy Research: The Demise of Civil Liberties and Academic Freedom in Contemporary 
Russia, 25 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 359, 362 (2015). 
 53 Id. 
 54 “‘[N]ationalization of elites’” is a policy of the Putin administration 
designed to reduce the odds of public servants and politicians having interests in 
foreign jurisdictions. Lester M. Salamon, Vladimir M. Benevolenski, & Lev I. 
Jakobson, Penetrating the Dual Realities of Government – Nonprofit Relations in Russia, 26 
VOLUNTAS 2178, 2206–07, 2210 (2015). An example of this policy is a law banning 
government officials from owning financial assets abroad. Id. at 2206. The 
“nationalization” extends beyond government officials and includes prominent 
members of civil society. See id. at 2206–07. Russian federal “Foreign Agents” law is 
part of this policy. Id. at 2210. 
 55 Popkova, supra note 11, at 3065. 
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traditional Russian values.56 Thus, critically examining the 
government’s framing of its legislative measures is key to 
understanding what these measures are truly aiming to accomplish. 
On July 20, 2012, the Russian government passed a federal law 
“On Foreign Agents” that significantly constrained the financial, 
communication, and administrative operations of NGOs receiving 
foreign funding and participating in transnational advocacy networks.57 
Under the 2012 law, NGOs must register with the Justice Ministry as 
“foreign agents”58 if they receive funding from foreign sources 
(government or private) and engage, “including in the interests of 
foreign principals,” in “political activity” taking place on the territory 
of the Russian Federation.59 The Foreign Agents Law defines “political 
activity” very broadly to cover almost all aspects of advocacy and 
human rights work: 
[a] non-commercial organization60 is considered to 
carry out political activity on the territory of the 
Russian Federation if, regardless of its statutory goals 
and purposes stated in its founding documents, it 
participates (including through financing) in organizing 
and implementing political actions aimed at influencing 
decision-making by state bodies intended for the 
change of state policy pursued by them, as well as in 
                                               
 56 Alexandra V. Orlova, Privatizing Homosexuality: Russia’s Reassertion of ‘Moral 
Sovereignty’ over Gay Rights, 11 HUM. RTS, & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 122, 176 (2017). 
 57 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Vnesenii Izmenenii v Otdel’nye Zakonodatel’nye 
Akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v Chasti Regulirovaniya Deyatel’nosti Nekommercheskikh 
Organizatsii, Vipolniyaiushikh Funktsii Innostrannovo Agenta [Fed. Law of the 
Russian Fed’n on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Fed’n 
Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Non-commercial Org.s Performing the 
Function of Foreign Agents], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA [ROS. GAZ.] Jul 20, 2012, No. 
121. 
 58 Id. Art. 1(1). 
 59 Id. Art. 2(2). 
 60 NGOs are included in the term “non-commercial organization,” see 
Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Nekommercheskih Organizatsiyah [Fed. Law of the Russian 
Fed’n on Non-Profit Organizations of the Russian Fed’n], ROSSIISKAIA GAZETA 
[ROS. GAZ.] Jan 12, 1996, as amended on Feb., 11, 2013, No. 7, Art.3, 4 and 6. 
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the shaping of public opinion for the aforementioned 
purposes. 61 
The Foreign Agents Law places additional administrative 
burdens on NGOs that have been designated as foreign agents, such 
as mandating separate accounts for funds from local and foreign 
sources, submitting biannual activity reports, quarterly reports on 
spending, and annual audits.62 The Foreign Agents Law also prescribed 
a number of criteria for conducting additional unscheduled audits of 
“foreign agent” NGOs.63 
Initially, the Foreign Agents Law required all NGOs that met 
the criteria prescribed in the law to register with the Ministry of Justice 
and to label all of their materials as produced by “foreign agents,”64 
with administrative penalties for failure to comply.65 When most 
Russian NGOs refused to voluntarily register as “foreign agents” with 
the Justice Ministry, the Russian parliament amended the Foreign 
Agents Law to authorize the Justice Ministry to register NGOs as 
“foreign agents” without their consent.66 On November 24, 2014, 
additional amendments to the Foreign Agents Law prohibited political 
parties from concluding contracts with NGOs designated as “foreign 
agents,” and NGOs registered as “foreign agents” were also prohibited 
from “participating in other ways in the electoral and referendum 
campaigns.”67 Moreover, in May 2016, further amendments expanded 
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the controversial definition of “political activity” to include almost all 
forms of public action undertaken by NGOs.68 While the new 
amendments still reference “influencing decision-making of state 
bodies” and “shaping of public opinion,” they also identify areas in 
which participating is deemed “political activity,” including state 
building, national security, constitutional order, foreign policy, socio-
economic and national development, development of the political 
system, and legislative regulation of human rights and freedoms.69 
Other activities now deemed to be “political” include, among other 
things, participation in and organization of public functions (e.g., 
meetings, demonstrations, pickets); organization of and participation 
in public debates and discussions; election monitoring; public petitions 
directed to state bodies and actions directed at influencing the activities 
of these bodies, including lobbying for legal change; and shaping of 
public opinion through public opinion or sociological surveys.70 
The government’s choice of the term “foreign agent” to 
describe NGOs receiving foreign funding and engaging in “political 
activity” has faced criticism both domestically and internationally.71 
The term “foreign agent” in Russian political and popular discourses 
often suggests association with spies and traitors.72 Thus, using the 
term “foreign agent” stigmatizes and ostracizes NGOs participating in 
transnational advocacy networks73 and silences those who criticize 
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governmental policies.74 In other words, the connotations of the term 
“foreign agent” belie the law’s true aim: revealing “enemies within.”75 
Indeed, this label created divisions within the Russian NGO 
community itself between NGOs receiving foreign funds and those 
not receiving such funds, with the latter being reluctant to cooperate 
with the former.76 In fact, many NGOs chose to cease operations 
rather than operate under the label “foreign agent.”77 
Problematic naming aside, the key criteria for an NGO to be 
labelled as a “foreign agent” include receipt of foreign funding and 
participation in “political activities.”78 Both of these criteria must be 
present,79 and both of these criteria pose problems. 
First, the criteria of receipt of money and other property from 
foreign sources is exceptionally broad and can cover almost any type 
of transactions with foreign funds, from payment for contracts or 
membership dues to a single monetary donation, receipt of office 
equipment, or financial award for winning a competition.80 The types 
of foreign funds are not restricted and can include payments from 
individuals, organizations, or governments.81 Additionally, neither the 
amount nor the purpose of the payments are prescribed by the law.82 
Thus, a small individual donation from abroad can trigger the 
requirements of the Foreign Agents Law if the NGO receiving such a 
                                               
 74 Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Legislation and Practice 
in the Russian Federation on Non-Commercial Organizations in Light of Council of 
Europe Standards: An Update, Strasbourg, CommDH (2015) 17, July 9, 2015 at ¶ 
70. 
 75 Kupina, supra note 72, at 46. 
 76 Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning Case 
N.9988/13 Ekozaschita and Others v. Russia and 48 other complaints, Strasbourg, 
CommDH (2017) 22, July 5, 2017 at ¶ 34. 
 77 Kupina, supra note 72, at 47. 
 78 A.A. Kashin, Status Inostrannogo Agenta, 21: 309 BUHGALTER I ZAKON 17, 
17 (2012). 
 79 Id. 
 80 A.I. Vasilenko, Prinyatie Zakona ‘Ob Inostrannyh Agentah’ Kak Pervyi Etap na 
Puti k Pravovomu Regulirovaniu Lobbistskoi Deyatelnosti v Rossii, 3:25 VESTNIK 
PERMSKOGO UNIVERSITETA 44, 46 (2014). 
 81 Kashin, supra note 78, at 18. 
 82 Id. at 19. 
2019 "Foreign Agents," Sovereignty, and Political Pluralism 7:2 
397 
donation participates in “political activity,” whether or not the money 
from such a donation was used to fund “political activity.”83 
The case of Russia’s major independent pollster, the Levada 
Center, illustrates the problematic nature of the provisions of the 
Foreign Agents Law. For twenty-eight years, the Levada Center has 
been one of the most important and respected research institutes in 
Russia,84 but the Levada Center was designated as a “foreign agent” by 
the Russian Justice Ministry in September of 2016.85 This designation 
came two weeks ahead of the Russian parliamentary election and 
resulted in the Center ceasing publication of its polling results prior to 
the election, despite having conducted similar polling since 1991.86 The 
Levada Center unsuccessfully argued that all of the foreign funds it 
received were not used for any “political activity,” but were instead 
used to conduct market surveys.87 Nevertheless, the Center’s 
sociological activity was equated with “political activity.”88 
The definition of “political activity” has been criticized as 
overly vague, as almost any NGO activity that aims to influence public 
opinion or governmental decision-making processes by calling for 
changes to government policies has been defined as engagement in 
political activity.89 Such an expansive definition of political activity 
arguably goes against one of the primary functions of NGOs as 
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“watchdogs” that aid in the review, critique, and exchange of ideas on 
all matters of public interest.90 
Additionally, Russian courts have classified holding 
roundtables and conferences to discuss government policy; publishing 
policy analysis documents, textbooks, or academic articles; and even 
handing out needles and condoms as part of HIV/AIDS prevention 
as participation in “political activity.”91 Indeed, it seems that the only 
way for a foreign-funded NGO to avoid falling within the scope of the 
law is to either agree with government policies or cease accepting 
foreign funding.92 For many Russian NGOs engaged in human rights 
work, e.g., LGBT advocacy, funding from domestic sources is simply 
not available due to lack of popular support for these causes.93 
Other issues with the Foreign Agents Law emerged as soon as 
the law came into effect. Some of these issues included a lack of clarity 
with regards to when administrative penalties will be applied to NGOs, 
as well as the retroactive application of the law, where decisions 
regarding participation in “political activities” were made based on the 
past activities of an organization or simply because the NGO had 
previously received foreign financing.94 Domestic courts were also 
reluctant to assess all of the factual circumstances surrounding the 
designation of NGOs as “foreign agents” thoroughly; instead, they 
tended to take information provided by the Ministry of Justice or the 
prosecutors at face value.95 Furthermore, domestic courts frequently 
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conflated “political activity” pursued by leaders of NGOs in their 
personal capacities with the activities of the organization itself, 
improperly attributing the activities of the leader to the organization.96 
A. Russian Constitutional Court Decision N.10-P (2014) 
On April 8, 2014, the Russian Constitutional Court held that 
the Foreign Agents Law complies overall with the Russian 
Constitution.97 The majority of the Russian Constitutional Court 
Justices acknowledged that freedom of association constitutes one of 
the fundamental freedoms in a democracy and ensures ideological and 
political pluralism.98 Guaranteeing this fundamental freedom is a 
responsibility of the state prescribed in the Russian Constitution, 
Article 30(1), as well as in various international instruments signed and 
ratified by the Russian Federation, including Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).99 Nevertheless, 
freedom of association may be limited, as long as those limitations are 
undertaken for a legitimate governmental purpose and the means 
chosen are proportional to such a purpose.100 The role of the 
Constitutional Court is to strike an appropriate balance.101 
The majority held that the designation of “foreign agent” as 
applied to qualifying NGOs does not mean that designated 
organizations constitute a national security threat, even if they act as 
agents of foreign principals.102 Hence, the majority of the Court opined 
that any attempts to equate the meaning of the phrase “foreign agent” 
with outdated stereotypes prevalent in Soviet times are groundless 
because the phrase “foreign agent” does not carry negative 
                                               
Europe Standards: An Update, Strasbourg, CommDH (2015) 17, July 9, 2015 at ¶ 
53. 
 96 Id. at ¶ 58. 
 97 Po Delu o Proverke Konstitutsionosti Polodzenii Punkta 6 Stat’yi 2 i 
Punkta 7 Stat’yi 32 Federal’nogo Zakona [On the Matter of Constitutionality of Art. 
2(6) and Art. 32(7) of the Fed. Law], Konst. Sud RF [RF Const. Court] 2014, No. 
10, ¶ 3.4. 
 98 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 99 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 100 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 101 Id. at ¶ 2. 
 102 Id. at ¶ 3.1. 
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:2 
400 
connotations.103 The majority reasoned that due to Russia’s extensive 
participation in the global community, the mere fact that an NGO 
receives foreign funds and participates in political activities cannot in 
and of itself constitute evidence of the disloyalty of such organizations 
to the Russian state.104 Thus, the legislative construction of the term 
“foreign agent” does not presuppose a negative assessment of such 
organizations by the Russian state and cannot be taken as evidence of 
distrust or intent to discredit such organizations or their activities by 
the state.105 
Additionally, the majority opined that in order to qualify 
actions of NGOs as political activity, actions “must be intended to 
influence decision-making by state bodies or influence state policy 
directly or by shaping public opinion.”106 In other words, an action may 
be political if it elicits a significant public response or attracts the 
attention of state bodies or civil society to the issue in question.107 The 
majority stated that political activities may include, but are not limited 
to, the following: public gatherings, demonstrations, marches, 
picketing, political agitation in the context of elections and referenda, 
public speeches to state bodies, and dissemination of opinions 
pertaining to decisions taken by authorities.108 The Court also observed 
that the existence of NGOs peacefully propagating ideas that are 
critical of governmental policies or that contradict popular opinion 
constitutes a “cornerstone of democratic society.”109 
The Court held that the regime for voluntary registration as a 
“foreign agent” established by the Foreign Agents Law did not prevent 
NGOs from seeking or receiving foreign funding or from carrying out 
political activities within the Russian Federation, and thus was not 
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discriminatory.110 The majority reasoned that the registration regime 
did not result in differential treatment between NGOs that receive 
foreign funding and those that do not.111 The registration requirements 
were instituted to ensure the transparency of NGOs’ work and were 
not aimed at interfering in their activities.112 Registration requirements 
were also meant to protect Russian sovereignty by preventing foreign-
funded NGOs from influencing Russian policies in the interests of 
foreign principals.113 
The majority stated that neither the amount nor the type of 
foreign financing was prescribed in order to avoid undue discretion 
when applying this criterion.114 
The Court also held that NGOs had a right of judicial review 
when it came to a designation as “foreign agent,” and the burden of 
proof remained on the authorities.115 Despite challenging some 
mandatory minimum administrative fines as unconstitutional,116 the 
majority concluded that provisions of the Foreign Agents Law were 
constitutional.117 
The judgment of the Constitutional Court contains a 
dissenting opinion by Justice Yaroslavtsev; he concluded that 
provisions of the Foreign Agents Law were not constitutional.118 
Justice Yaroslavtsev reasoned that the idea behind the constitutionally 
protected right of freedom of association is to enable each and every 
citizen to participate in the civil and political life of the state.119 Hence, 
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citizens holding strong political views are able to increase their 
participation in political governance through participation in NGOs.120 
Thus, participation of NGOs in the development and realization of 
governmental policies constitutes a normal practice of interaction 
between civil society and the state.121 
Moreover, freedom of association cannot be fully realized 
without NGOs being able to attract financing for their activities from 
all sources not prohibited by law.122 Justice Yaroslavtsev reasoned that 
according to the European Court of Human Rights, pluralism 
constitutes one of the “hallmarks” of democracy, and plurality of 
opinions may be expressed by individuals joining NGOs dedicated to 
particular causes.123 Nevertheless, Justice Yaroslavtsev stated that 
freedom of association is not absolute and can be limited in a 
democratic society to the extent necessary for specific purposes, such 
as health, constitutional order, morality, and national security.124 
However, the federal legislator125 must ensure that this constitutionally 
protected right is limited to the minimum extent possible, without such 
limitations “hollowing out” the core of the constitutionally protected 
right and making it meaningless.126 
The Foreign Agents Law created a special group of NGOs: 
those acting as “foreign agents.”127 However, the federal legislation 
does not require an “agency relationship” to exist between a foreign-
funded NGO and a foreign principal.128 Requirements for registering 
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as a “foreign agent” include receipt of funding from foreign sources 
and engaging in “political activity,” “including in the interests of 
foreign principals,” on the territory of the Russian Federation.129 
Hence, it is apparent from the wording of the legislation that acting in 
the interests of foreign principals is not mandatory.130 
Furthermore, Justice Yaroslavtsev reasoned that certain terms 
contained in the Foreign Agents Law, such as “political actions” and 
“shaping of public opinion,” are vague.131 Both NGOs and law 
enforcement officials must determine whether the NGO is shaping 
public opinion on a case by case basis.132 Additionally, the Foreign 
Agents Law does not specify with any level of certainty which activities 
can be classified as “political.”133 Thus, instead of greater transparency, 
the Foreign Agents Law has achieved the reverse effect.134 
The Foreign Agents Law creates inequality between various 
NGOs depending on their financing, with neither foreign financing 
nor participation in “political activities” being prohibited.135 Justice 
Yaroslavstev opined that the term “foreign agent” carries with it a 
negative connotation designed to elicit a negative public reaction to 
those qualifying NGOs.136 Equality and political pluralism are 
constitutionally guaranteed in the Russian Federation, so foreign-
funded NGOs should be able to participate in political activities on the 
same terms as NGOs not receiving such financing, regardless of their 
opinions about governmental policies.137 Freedom of association 
presupposes not only the creation of such associations, but also their 
functions, including participation in activities that are directed at 
peacefully advancing ideas that will not be positively received by either 
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the government or the majority of the population.138 Such tolerance 
and pluralism is the cornerstone of democracy.139 Provisions of the 
Foreign Agents Law violate a number of constitutional principles, such 
as political and ideological pluralism, freedom of association, equality 
before the law, and protection of personal dignity.140 
Case analysis reveals that the majority opinion of the Russian 
Constitutional Court arguably fails to address many of the criticisms 
that were levelled at various provisions of the Russian Foreign Agents 
Law, particularly the vagueness of the term “political activity,” the 
pejorative designation of “foreign agent,” and the inclusion of all types 
and amounts of foreign financing.141 The majority cited the need to 
ensure transparency as the key reason for creating a regime for NGOs 
to register as “foreign agents.”142 However, the majority failed to 
explain the necessity for creating this new onerous registration regime 
when legislative provisions aimed at ensuring transparency in NGO 
activities and financing already exist under Russian law.143 Clearly, 
rather than ensuring greater transparency, the government’s aim in 
creating a registry of “foreign agents” was to assert greater control over 
foreign-funded NGOs participating in transnational advocacy 
networks, as well as to create barriers inhibiting their effective 
operation.144 Although the majority rightly pointed out that neither 
participation in political activities nor receiving foreign financing has 
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been prohibited by the Foreign Agents Law, the majority failed to 
address the serious impediments that the Foreign Agents Law imposes 
on NGOs.145 Justice Yaroslavtsev’s dissent rightly challenges the key 
conclusions of the majority by pointing out the vagueness of various 
terms contained in the Foreign Agents Law and contesting the 
proclaimed neutrality of the designation of “foreign agent.”146 
B. U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Meese v. Keene (1987) 
In defending the Russian Foreign Agents Law, Russian 
government officials repeatedly reference international precedents, 
with a particular emphasis on the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
(FARA) which supposedly contains provisions similar to the Russian 
law.147 A closer examination of both FARA and the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Meese v. Keene dealing with the constitutionality of 
“political propaganda” provisions in FARA148 and the resulting 
amendments reveals that “fine details” frequently get “lost in 
translation when comparing judicial systems” across different 
jurisdictions, and “can be used strategically to advance specific national 
political goals.”149 On April 28, 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court in Meese 
v. Keene considered the constitutionality of the term “political 
propaganda,” which was contained in FARA.150 FARA used this 
particular term to identify materials subject to its requirements, and 
defined the term as a “‘communication or expression’”151 that is 
intended to 
prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any other way 
influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United 
States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or 
relations of a government or a foreign country or a foreign political 
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party or with reference to the foreign policies of the United 
States. . . .152 
Appellee Keene, who was a member of the California State 
Senate, wanted to show three Canadian films about acid rain and 
nuclear war that the United States Department of Justice had identified 
as “political propaganda” under FARA.153 However, the appellee did 
not want to be publicly regarded as a disseminator of political 
propaganda, as dictated by the mandatory disclosure requirements that 
demand that those viewing the films be informed that the films are 
identified as “political propaganda.”154 The appellee was concerned 
with the impact on his reputation, in light of the public reaction to 
materials to which the terms “political propaganda” applies.155 The 
District Court for the Eastern District of California asserted that the 
label “political propaganda” has the effect of making the public believe 
that the material has been “officially censured” and is pejorative and 
unnecessary, thus constituting an unconstitutional abridgment of free 
speech.156 The District Court concluded that the term “propaganda” 
was a “semantically slanted word of reprobation. . . .”157 Thus, labelling 
expressive materials as “political propaganda” rendered them 
unavailable to citizens who wanted to “use them as a means of personal 
expression.”158 The District Court further concluded that there was 
“no compelling state interest to justify the use of such a pejorative 
label. . . .”159 Thus, continuing to label expressive materials “political 
propaganda” was an “invalid . . . abridgment of speech.”160 
Despite the judgment of the District Court, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that FARA’s use of the term “political propaganda” was 
constitutional.161 The Supreme Court commenced its reasoning by 
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referencing the overall regulatory scheme of FARA.162 The Court 
stated that the main purpose of the regulatory scheme was 
to protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign 
relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure by persons 
engaging in propaganda activities and other activities for or on behalf 
of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other foreign 
principals so that the Government and the people of the United States 
may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their 
statements and actions in the light of their associations and activities.163 
In other words, FARA is directed at protecting national 
security and ensuring transparency among those who act for or on 
behalf of foreign interests. Thus, FARA “requires all agents of foreign 
principals to file detailed registration statements. . . .”164 Such 
registration requirements apply “equally to agents of friendly, neutral, 
and unfriendly governments,”165 who in turn must label all materials 
that have been classified as “political propaganda,” for the reason that 
“they contain political material intended to influence the foreign 
policies of the United States. . . .”166 
The Supreme Court noted that FARA defined the term 
“political propaganda” as including not only slanted and “misleading 
advocacy,” but also advocacy materials that are accurate and deserve 
the “highest respect.”167 Thus, the statutory definition encompasses 
both neutral and pejorative meanings.168 Among other things, the 
Court then pointed out that FARA neither prohibits access to materials 
labelled “political propaganda,” nor the distribution of such 
materials.169 The District Court erroneously and paternalistically 
assumed that public reaction to the label “political propaganda” would 
be overwhelmingly negative, so the District Court decided that it 
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would be best to protect the public from “too much information” in 
order to prevent misunderstanding and misuse.170 The Supreme Court 
proposed an alternative to the District Court’s erroneous paternalism: 
“‘to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people 
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and that the best means to the end is to open the channels 
of communication rather than to close them. . . .’”171 The Supreme 
Court ultimately held that FARA did not impermissibly restrict free 
speech and was thus constitutional.172 
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
dissented in part, and stated that the majority formed its opinion 
regarding the term “political propaganda” as neutral by “limiting its 
examination to the statutory definition of the term and by ignoring the 
realities of public reaction to the designation.”173 Justice Blackmun 
stated that even the limited definition of “political propaganda” 
contained in FARA could not be regarded as neutral: according to the 
legislative history of FARA, Congress intended to “discourage 
communications by foreign agents.”174 The dissenting justices stated 
that even if Congress defined the term “political propaganda” in 
“completely neutral” terms, it would not necessarily amount to 
sufficient protection of freedom of speech.175 According to the dissent, 
the majority was too dismissive of the “‘potential misunderstanding of 
[the statute’s] effect.’”176 Hence, the statute’s “‘practical effect’” and its 
potential to “‘discourage protected speech’” must be considered.177 
In this particular case, the appellee did “not argue that his 
speech [was] deterred by” FARA’s “political propaganda” definition, 
but the appellee did argue that “his speech [was] deterred by” how the 
material that had been designated as “political propaganda” was 
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perceived by the public.178 The appellee submitted expert testimony 
that: 
the designation “political propaganda” of a film or book by the 
government is pejorative, denigrating to the material, and stigmatizing 
to those disseminating it . . . to call something propaganda is to assert 
that it communicates hidden or deceitful ideas; that concealed interests 
are involved; that unfair or insidious methods [are] being 
employed. . . .179 
This expert testimony was unrebutted, and the dissent felt that 
this testimony indicated that the majority erroneously concluded that 
“‘propaganda’” is a “neutral classification.”180According to the dissent, 
“an unjustifiably narrow view of the sort of government action that 
can violate” free speech was adopted by the majority and the majority 
ignored the practical effects of materials being classified as “political 
propaganda.”181 The practical effects of such a classification “create an 
indirect burden on expression.”182 The dissent added that “indirect 
discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on 
speech. . . .”183 Designation as “political propaganda” taints a material’s 
message, puts individuals and organizations wishing to display such 
materials on the defensive, and has a “‘deterrent and “chilling” effect 
on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, 
expression, and association.’”184 While the majority classified the 
approach by the lower District Court as “paternalistic,” the dissenting 
justices concluded that the governmental classification of materials as 
“political propaganda” is what is paternalistic.185 The dissenting justices 
stated that 
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[g]overnment action does more than simply provide 
additional information. It places the power of the 
Federal Government, with its authority, presumed 
neutrality, and assumed access to all the facts, behind 
an appellation designed to reduce the effectiveness of the 
speech in the eyes of the public.186 
The dissenting justices found that labelling materials as 
“political propaganda” constituted an unconstitutional infringement 
on rights guaranteed by the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.187 Ultimately, the dissenting justices won the day, for 
Section 611(j) of FARA defining the term “political propaganda” was 
later repealed in 1995.188 
III. “LOST IN TRANSLATION”: COMPARING THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN 
EXPERIENCE 
While Russian legislators frequently reference FARA as 
precedent for the Russian Foreign Agents Law, upon closer 
examination, unlike the Russian legislation, FARA primarily 
emphasizes the existence of an “agency relationship” between a 
domestic organization and its foreign principal.189 A high standard of 
proof must be satisfied in order to prove that the agency relationship 
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exists.190 Additionally, in Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc.,191 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that 
in determining whether any set of facts establishes that 
someone is acting as an agent for a foreign principal within the 
meaning of the Act it is important to consider the limitations on types 
of activity Congress intended to reach. Congress was particularly 
concerned that registration would not be imposed to stifle internal 
debate on political issues by citizens sympathetic to the views of 
foreigners but free from foreign direction or control. In amending the 
definition of agent in 1966 Congress emphasized that the Act should 
not require the registration “of persons who are not, in fact, agents of 
foreign principals but whose acts may incidentally be of benefit to 
foreign interests, even though such acts are part of the normal course 
of those persons’ own rights of free speech, petition or assembly.”192 
Furthermore, the scope of the regulated activity under FARA 
is much narrower than the Russian Foreign Agents Law, for FARA is 
mostly concerned with lobbying, consultancy, and advertising.193 Most 
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actions of Russian NGOs that are captured under the Russian Foreign 
Agents Law would not be captured under FARA.194 
Comparing the corresponding decisions of Russian and U.S. 
courts can also be helpful. In their respective cases, both the Russian 
and U.S. courts state that the terms at issue were neutral and thus did 
not violate the constitutional rights of those trying to deal with these 
designations by impeding their functions. Both courts reference 
governmental purposes of protecting national security and ensuring 
transparency. However, one key difference between the Russian 
Constitutional Court ruling and the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Meese 
v. Keene is the emphasis on agency relationships in the U.S. case and the 
absence thereof from the Russian case.195 In its current form, FARA is 
directed towards a very limited number of organizations that are 
mostly engaged in lobbying activity and are acting as agents of foreign 
principals.196 The Russian Foreign Agents Law targets different 
organizations than FARA.197 FARA requirements were clearly meant 
to apply only to those who were acting as agents of foreign principals, 
rather than those who sympathized and even promoted “foreign” 
views but were not agents of foreign principals. The judgment of the 
majority of the Russian Constitutional Court indicates that controlling 
and suppressing “foreign views” was the key aim of the Russian 
state.198 
While the majority opinions of both Russian and U.S. Courts 
contain similar reasoning, the dissenting opinions are also very 
informative, as they challenge the notion of the “neutrality” of the 
designations and consider the actual impact of the use of the terms 
“political propaganda” or “foreign agent.”199 Both dissents discuss the 
“tainted message” that follows these designations, and the resulting 
“chilling effect” of these provisions on freedoms of association and 
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speech.200 Both dissenting opinions emphasize that the freedoms of 
speech and association protect opinions and actions, regardless of 
whether the government or even the population supports those 
opinions and acts. Such is the nature of a pluralistic democratic society. 
Furthermore, these unpopular points of view cannot be shut down by 
either direct or indirect means. 
IV. “FOREIGN AGENTS” AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
Given the 2014 decision of the Russian Constitutional Court 
confirming the constitutionality of various provisions of the Russian 
Foreign Agents Law, as well as subsequent amendments that made it 
even harder for the Russian NGOs that receive foreign funding to 
participate in political activities, in March of 2018, forty-eight Russian 
NGOs that were classified as “foreign agents” filed a complaint in 
front of the European Court of Human Rights.201 In their complaint 
to the Strasbourg Court, the NGOs emphasized the lack of a 
requirement of an agency relationship between Russian NGOs and 
foreign donors in the Russian law; the all-encompassing nature of 
foreign financing; the vagueness of the term “political activity;” the 
lack of guidance in labelling materials produced by NGOs that have 
been designated as “foreign agents;” and the lack of proportionality of 
governmental measures.202 The complainants asserted that the current 
requirements of the Foreign Agents Law make seeking foreign 
financing very difficult for NGOs, even though domestic financing is 
frequently quite limited.203 Furthermore, provisions dealing with 
“political activity” effectively reduce NGOs’ dialogue with the 
government.204 Overall, the NGOs argued that the real governmental 
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aim behind this legislation was not to increase transparency, but rather 
to shut down dissenting views.205 
The massive demonstrations protesting election falsification in 
the winter of 2011–12 and NGOs’ active involvement in election 
monitoring resulted in a “political counter-offensive from the 
government. . . .”206 This effort culminated in the passage of the 
Foreign Agents Law, among other measures, in 2012. The key aims of 
the law are to cut off Russian NGOs from foreign funding and any 
sort of “political activity.”207 In other words, “the NGO Law has had 
the effect of ‘crowding out’ the civic sphere organisations that are 
critical of the authorities, supplanting these groups with organisations 
that are neutral or loyal to the regime.”208 The term “foreign agent” 
itself is a “throwback to espionage accusations during the Cold War”209 
and was deliberately chosen to discredit and stigmatize foreign-funded 
NGOs participating in transnational advocacy networks.210 Politically 
active advocacy networks have been gradually replaced by politically 
neutral social groups as a result of the government’s efforts.211 NGOs 
that want to continue operating in the political realm are forced to not 
only give up their foreign funding, but also to take account of the 
political risks inherent in this shift from foreign to domestic—largely 
government—financing.212 Many realized that in order to access 
governmental funds, they would have to adopt a less critical stance.213 
This, in turn, created friction between NGOs loyal to the government 
and those critical of the government, leading to concerns about the 
“future quality of Russia’s governance” in a sociopolitical environment 
not openly critical of the government.214 Furthermore, citizens might 
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not participate as actively in policy work if the NGOs with which they 
would previously partner can no longer advocate critically.215 
CONCLUSION 
While national security undoubtedly constitutes a key 
governmental goal, it cannot overshadow rights. In other words, 
human security may be a precondition to liberty, but it 
should not be valued above liberty for, when so 
weighted, it is capable of destroying liberty. A society 
that exaggerates its security requirements can debase 
the values it cherishes. Free societies accept less 
security and, consequently endure some pain and 
suffering, in order to emphasize their humanity and 
civility.216 
Even though rights do expand and contract in relation to 
changing circumstances,217 arguably, they cannot be contracted to the 
point of making them meaningless, which is precisely what the Russian 
Foreign Agents Law aims to do. Once laws are enacted, they greatly 
influence their subjects by shaping their political choices and 
standardizing behavior.218 The enactment of the Russian Foreign 
Agents Law was meant to reshape NGOs’ activist practices by 
stigmatizing their international cooperation and participation in 
political activities as well as transnational advocacy networks.219 The 
law reshaped the nature of domestic interactions and impacted 
interactions within transnational networks, where global partners have 
been forced to adapt their approaches to the restrictive legislative 
provisions if they choose to continue working with Russian partners.220 
Thus, the law itself, as well as its interpretations through judicial 
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rulings, becomes a constraining mechanism nationally as well as 
internationally.221 Challenging the law in various judicial realms, be they 
domestic constitutional courts or international adjudicative bodies, 
while useful in making the arguments of all sides transparent, also 
softens the “direct combat between activists and the state.”222 This 
“juridification” of the issues, while reducing violence, also de-
politicizes the nature of the interactions by forcing the parties into the 
frameworks of legal arguments.223 Ultimately, this de-politicization 
reflects the decline of political pluralism in Russia.224 The Foreign 
Agents Law is yet another element in this overall trend. 
While national security and ensuring transparency are laudable 
goals, they are frequently misused to accomplish ulterior aims. In 
Russia, provisions of the Foreign Agents Law have been utilized to 
stifle internal debates and dissenting views, particularly when such 
views are critical of the state and sympathetic to so-called “Western 
ideas.” Individuals and organizations expressing such views have now 
been legislatively ostracized, marginalized, and presented as posing an 
existential threat to Russia itself.225 The Russian Constitutional Court 
itself has contributed to this delegitimization. The narrative of national 
security has become increasingly difficult to challenge either 
domestically or internationally, ultimately making the change “from 
values of survival to values of self-expression less likely.”226 
Challenging the Foreign Agents Law at the level of the European 
Court of Human Rights is only useful to the point that the Strasbourg 
Court’s future ruling will be accepted and implemented by Russia.227 
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This is an uncertain outcome, given Russia’s recent tense relationship 
with the European Court of Human Rights and refusal to implement 
the Strasbourg Court’s decisions when those decisions are deemed to 
contradict Russian constitutional principles.228 Russia needs to engage 
in a wholesale rethinking of the notion of national security itself—a 
notion that includes social, economic, and human rights concerns. 
Only such a reconceptualization will allow NGOs to be viewed as 
partners, rather than enemies, in ensuring national security. 
                                               
post/wp/2018/10/30/russia-is-preparing-to-back-out-of-its-last-human-rights-
commitments-in-europe/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bf5297a64fc6. 
 228 Alexandra V. Orlova, Sovereignty, Dissent, and the Shaping of International 
Consensus around Human Rights: An Examination of Russian ‘Disengagement’ from the 
European Court of Human Rights, 35 ARIZONA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 463 (2018). 
